As the Turkish election campaign reaches its final stage, there is consensus that the election should be seen as a referendum on Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the man who has ruled the country for almost two decades.
Erdogan often boasted that he never lost the election. Since 2002, he and his AKP (Justice and Development Party) have won: five parliamentary elections, three local elections, three referenda and one presidential election.
But what if the victory he expects to receive next week turns out to be a tactical victory and strategic loss?
Erdogan won his first victory in the national election, while Turkish politics came to a standstill and demanded radical changes.
Erdogan made some changes, and at least during the first decade he managed to create what looked like peace and prosperity.
However, now observers of the Turkish experience almost unanimously agreed that not only those who promised the golden shores, but also the leadership of Erdogan, led to five new dead ends.
Political deadlock
Concentrating power on one president, which means “in one hand”, after the death of Ataturk, Turkey took almost half a century to change such a system, but Erdogan upset the institutional balance and pluralism of the political system developed since the last military groups in the 1980s .
Turkey intends to destroy American forces at its borders. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan promised that the Turkish army is ready to strike at any moment.
Two decades ago, Erdogan was the representative of a new message about pluralism — the separation of powers. By voting for Erdogan, the Turks no longer vote for the program, philosophy, or even the new ruling elite, they vote only for Erdogan.
Paradoxically, the Turkish voter today knows less about who Erdoогan really is or who he wants to be than two decades ago. Uncertainty about the future of Turkish institutions is more acute than during the post-war Turgot Ozal period, organized by corrupt and incompetent parties.
Self identification problem
The second impasse that arose under Erdogan concerns the annoying identity problem, most clearly underlined by the four-year failure of rule in Ankara, to create a normal lifestyle with ethnic Kurds, who account for at least 15% of the population.
Ataturk decided to solve the problem by abandoning it. He rejected the Ottoman system of “unity in diversity”, inventing the ideal “Turkish identity”, which ignored ethnic, religious and cultural differences in society, rich in its diversity. Ataturk’s policy led to a dead end, namely to a civil war in which more than 40 thousand people died.
Erdogan initially understood the wisdom of the Ottoman policy of managing ethnic prejudices, regarding diversity as an asset. His policy was initially successful in defusing the Kurdish «time bomb» through a series of acceptable actions. However, Erdogan later tried to “drown the fish,” dividing the nation into numerous ethnic communities, of which the Kurds would be one of many. Such a trick ensured the failure of his initially promising policy.
Of course, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) contributed to this failure, adhering to its dogmatic, cruel and Stalinist methods. Today, the Kurdish question is more acute than ever.
Rejection of the European dream
The third impasse concerns Turkish aspirations for full membership in the European Union — a goal shared by almost all political parties since the 1960s.
The Turkish President spoke about how the EU forgot about its promise. Brussels said it would provide 3 billion euros for the restoration of northern Syria, but no one saw this money.
Maybe the “destination by which Europe” was nothing but an empty slogan, as the strong voices of the European Union oppose Turkish membership for a number of reasons, including racism and fears about Islam.
Nevertheless, the slogan provided a solid history in favor of democratic reforms and economic liberalization, which suppressed narrow party and guerrilla interests and problems.
However, today Turkey is “farther than ever” from “entering Europe”. Almost all parties contesting next week’s elections at presidential and parliamentary levels agree that the road to Europe is blocked, at least for the foreseeable future.
Aggravation of relations with NATO and the USA
Erdogan also created the fourth impasse in Turkey’s relations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its leader, the United States. This led to a situation where the Turkish forces invading Syria, at some point, feared a direct clash with American troops, helping the Syrian Kurds to strengthen their possession in part of the territory.
Erdogan’s participation in Syria has forced closer cooperation with Russia, which has become a major player in this conflict. This, in turn, led to a cooling of Turkey’s relations with both the United States and the European Union, when they had their problems with Russia. Too late, Erdogan realized that a non-NATO Turkey would not be as valuable to Russia.
Economic crisis
Finally, Erdogan created a fifth — economic — impasse, casting a shadow of doubt about the strategic options that he might consider after reaffirming his position.
Four years ago, Turkey seems to have definitely moved to a model of economic liberalism that supported private enterprise, limited the public sector to several key areas, and respected international norms and practices, especially with regard to transparency and the rule of law.
Today, the Turkish economy seems to be subject to interventionist temptations, corrupt practices and fraud, common in the so-called «developing countries» with a small autocratic government.
Not surprisingly, foreign direct investment fell to its lowest level since 2010, while the Turkish currency (lira) lost almost a third of its value compared to a basket of world currencies. World Bank projected annual growth rate in Turkey remains lowest since 2008
Paradoxically, in this election campaign, not one of these dead ends was as noticeable as it deserved. In this sense, Erdogan may already have won.
In times of uncertainty, many voters may decide that it is better to stick with the devil that they know, rather than risk following the unknown. However, Erdogan’s victory could also turn out to be his loss, especially if, as many expect, the turnout and his share of the vote go down.
