However, earnings on overbought BFL clearly had larger leverage in terms of a gradual increase in interest rates, the fed has become more risky.
This highly compelling newsworthy was the starting point for ending the game in a carry trade by foreign speculative capital. January “Kremlin report”, which has an even more serious potential unpredictable pressure on Russian business, by the way, this point did not. After its publication the market was still strong expectations for new easing of monetary policy of Russian Central Bank and the gradual achievement of the key rate target to 6%.
So in April, despite a corporate (rather than sectoral) nature of the new sanctions, began a rapid decline in prices OFZ and, as a consequence, the flight of speculative capital, which has led to a rapid increase in the rate of foreign currency, primarily the dollar. This escape is due to the price paradox: the weakening of the ruble proceeded against the backdrop of rising oil prices.
Any strong price trend begins rapidly, then gradually loses pace, but accelerated in its completion. After a difficult April there was a relatively stable may, June, July, but in August, the rouble has again crippled.
The main causes of the weakness of the Russian currency is clear. Here you can add more and higher expected inflation (from July’s 2.5% per annum, it rose to 3.1% in August, and it is unlikely this high). But the inflationary contribution to the fate of the ruble while that seems very modest. Non-residents, estimated, deduced from BFL about 25% of the capacity of this sector (their share in September probably will drop to 10% in April was about 35%), and it is close to 2.5 trillion rubles, or $40 billion, a Huge sum that can damage even very large and stable foreign trade balance.
But every percentage of outgoing non-resident has less impact on the exchange rate. And to leave already, in General, no one.
Graphic design in the pair dollar-ruble, unfortunately for many, easily allows for the exit of the pair to the levels of 70.5 and even 72 rubles. But it also indicates great resistance to continued growth in reaching these values, and the emergence of a new price momentum is now downward, in the direction of 60-65 rubles.
Money market rates, in contrast to 2014, not gallop, and stopped at comfortable levels. It and is clear: at current oil price cash market may not experience shortages of cash.
Oil is the main and not yet played the trump card of the ruble in 2014. Four years ago was a frightening selloff in oil futures. Starting from $115 per barrel, the price of Brent this has resulted in a fourfold. The current $75-80 is the price levels, which by the end of 2014 could only dream of.
It is not necessary to overestimate the toughening anti-Russian sanctions. First, all the painful (sectoral sanctions restrict access to capital and investment) occurred in the same year 2014.
Secondly, the Western world has split into two camps: US, who spend a confrontational and protectionist policy not only towards Russia but also for Iran, China, Latin America, and now, apparently, India; and Europe, which, with the exception only of the UK, long sabotaging new solutions to Washington.
Of course, the recent collapse of the Turkish Lira makes the search for analogies with the future of the ruble. But she is rather past the Russian currency. The weakness of the Lira is a reflection of many years of degradation of the economy and the political system of the Turkish Republic. Despite the fact that Russia’s political system is also far from ideal, our economy has passed through a structural crisis in the years 2014-2016 and now fairly stable.
So I’m waiting for the dollar at 60-65 rubles in the current year and not overdramatising because of unpleasant, but peculiar to any normal market oscillation phenomena.